Hideshi Itoh

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

Waseda Business School

Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda

Shinjuku-ku

Tokyo, Tokyo 169-8050

Japan

http://https://www.waseda.jp/fcom/wbs/en

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
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Top 25,057

in Total Papers Downloads

2,560

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 23,478

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 23,478

in Total Papers Citations

30

CROSSREF CITATIONS

12

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 12 Sep 2004
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 641 (53,026)
Citation 18

Abstract:

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Holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, renegotiation, repeated transaction, long-term relationships

2.

The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Mar 2005
Kohei Daido, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Kwansei Gakuin University - School of Economics and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 464 (79,269)

Abstract:

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Self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Oct 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 341 (112,280)
Citation 14

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Posted: 13 Nov 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract:

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

4.

Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript

Number of pages: 202 Posted: 26 Sep 2014
Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of California, Berkeley, Independent, Gakushuin University, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), University of Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagoya University, Graduate School of lawNagoya University, Graduate School of law, Stanford Law School, Independent, Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce, Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, Harvard Law School, Indiana University Bloomington - Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Yale Law School, Waseda University, Independent, Doshisha University, Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, Independent, Independent, Independent, Independent, University of Virginia School of Law, Waseda University - School of Law and University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 298 (130,720)

Abstract:

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5.

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2019
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Kimiyuki Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Senshu University, Department of Economics
Downloads 267 (146,483)
Citation 3

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Decision Process, Preference Heterogeneity, Information Acquisition, Communication, Biased Agent, Complementarities

6.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Shingo Ishiguro, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Nanzan University - School of Business Administration and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 245 (159,501)

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7.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Aug 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 143 (257,312)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, repeated transactions, long-term relationships

8.

The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Jul 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Zenichi Shishido
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law
Downloads 113 (306,661)
Citation 1

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9.

Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 23 Aug 2019
Eric S. Chou, Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Chienā€Lung Chen
National Tsing Hua University, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Academia Sinica
Downloads 48 (493,045)

Abstract:

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relational contracts, hidden action, unequal discounting