Krishnamurthy Iyer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

111 Church St SE

Minneapolis, MN 55455

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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4,140

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 18,608

in Total Papers Citations

41

CROSSREF CITATIONS

16

Scholarly Papers (13)

1.

Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 31 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 10 Nov 2014
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Mukund Sundararajan
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Google Inc.
Downloads 1,135 (24,160)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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mean field equilibrium, dynamic auction markets, conjoint valuation

2.

Welfare Analysis of Dark Pools

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Apr 2012 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2018
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 609 (56,852)

Abstract:

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dark pools, welfare, adverse selection, competitive markets

3.

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 528 (68,039)
Citation 11

Abstract:

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dynamic Bayesian persuasion, infinite linear program, threshold mechanism

4.

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 446 (83,516)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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artificial currency, mechanism design, welfare, repeated allocation

5.

Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 02 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 01 Nov 2011
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 290 (135,104)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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information aggregation, smooth markets, cost functions

6.

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 13 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 11 May 2020
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and David Lingenbrink
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University
Downloads 209 (186,340)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Bayesian persuasion, non-expected utility maximizers, revelation principle

7.

Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 202 (192,368)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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artificial currency, welfare, incentive compatibility, repeated all-pay auctions

8.

Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 May 2018 Last Revised: 05 Aug 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 182 (211,180)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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inventory signaling, information design

9.

When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2017
Jiayang Gao, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Huseyin Topaloglu
Cornell University - Operations Research & Industrial Engineering, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering
Downloads 169 (224,920)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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priority queues, mechanism design, game theory

10.

When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 10 May 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 166 (228,411)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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mechanism design, collusion, efficient allocation, impossibility results, surplus submodularity

11.

Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search With Endogenous Budgets

INSEAD Working Paper No. 2018/47/TOM
Number of pages: 83 Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 15 May 2020
Dragos Florin Ciocan and Krishnamurthy Iyer
INSEAD and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 74 (401,411)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Auctions, Bipartite Matching, Endogenous Budgets

12.

The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 30 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2021
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 68 (420,279)

Abstract:

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Non-monetary mechanism, artificial currency, repeated auction, price of anarchy, robust mechanism design

13.

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 24 May 2021 Last Revised: 20 Oct 2021
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Vahideh Manshadi
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Yale School of Management
Downloads 62 (440,708)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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information design, social services, Pareto improvement, congestion