Daniel Saavedra

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Assistant Professor

Los Angeles, CA

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

DOWNLOADS
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Top 10,998

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5,650

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 12,508

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 12,508

in Total Papers Citations

73

CROSSREF CITATIONS

23

Scholarly Papers (11)

The Taxman Cometh: Does Tax Uncertainty Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

Review of Accounting Studies, September 2017, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 1198–1228 , Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 18-1
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 11 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 04 May 2018
Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew and Daniel Saavedra
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 1,537 (15,021)
Citation 6

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Cash holdings; Tax avoidance; Tax uncertainty; FIN 48; Disclosures; Long-run repatriation tax costs

The Taxman Cometh: Does Tax Uncertainty Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2017
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 10 Mar 2018
Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew and Daniel Saavedra
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 107 (321,302)
Citation 29

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Cash Holdings; Tax Avoidance; Tax Uncertainty; FIN 48; Disclosures; Long-Run Repatriation Tax Costs

2.

The Pecking Order and Financing Decisions: Evidence from Changes to Financial Reporting Regulation

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 07 Apr 2020
Patricia L. Naranjo, Daniel Saavedra and Rodrigo S. Verdi
Rice University, UCLA Anderson School of Management and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 1,452 (16,717)
Citation 3

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Financial Reporting Regulation, Financing Decisions, Information Asymmetry, Capital Structure, International Accounting, IAS, IFRS

Is Tax Volatility Priced by Lenders in the Syndicated Loan Market?

European Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 25 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2018
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 709 (45,901)
Citation 2

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Tax Volatility, Debt Contracting, Tax Risk, Borrowing Costs

Is Tax Volatility Priced by Lenders in the Syndicated Loan Market?

European Accounting Review Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 03 Jan 2019
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 49 (498,528)
Citation 3

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Tax Volatility, Debt Contracting, Tax Risk, Borrowing Costs

Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 08 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2017
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 505 (70,997)
Citation 3

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Renegotiation, Bargaining, Incomplete Contracts, Security Design, Bank Loans

Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Mar 2018
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 78 (393,189)
Citation 7

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Renegotiation, Incomplete Contracts, Syndicate Size, Covenants

5.

Analysis of Unsuccessful Tax Avoiders

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 27 Aug 2014
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 322 (120,676)
Citation 2

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Unsuccessful Tax Avoidance, Failed Tax Strategies, Tax Settlements, Debt Contracting

6.

Noncompliance with SEC Regulations: Evidence from Timely Loan Disclosures

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 10 Jun 2020 Last Revised: 12 Apr 2021
Judson Caskey, Kanyuan (Kevin) Huang and Daniel Saavedra
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 231 (170,036)
Citation 1

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Disclosure, Bank Loans, SEC Monitoring, Form 8-K, Materiality

7.

The Information Content of Forgoing Tax Refunds: Evidence from Private Debt Contracts

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 04 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 23 Mar 2019
Daniel Saavedra and John S. Hughes
UCLA Anderson School of Management and University of California at Los Angeles
Downloads 175 (218,109)
Citation 2

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Tax Refunds, Debt Contracting, Communication, Revelation, Tax Policy, Tax Loss Carryback

8.

How Do Debt Contracts Allocate Control Over Unforeseen Investment Decisions?

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 23 May 2018 Last Revised: 09 Jul 2019
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 162 (232,797)
Citation 2

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Investments, Loan Maturity, Covenants, Security Design, Bank Loans

9.

Do Lenders Influence Borrowers’ Mandatory Disclosures? Evidence From Redacted Credit Agreements

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 30 Dec 2019
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 158 (237,848)
Citation 1

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Disclosure, Banks, Redacted Credit Agreements, Redacted Disclosure

10.

Capital Market Consequences of the Libor Scandal and Phaseout for Public Borrowers

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 27 Sep 2020 Last Revised: 16 Oct 2020
Jonathan Berkovitch, Henry L. Friedman and Daniel Saavedra
Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Business and Management, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 97 (340,598)

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LIBOR scandal, LIBOR phaseout, debt contracting, incomplete contracting

11.

Amendment thresholds and voting rules in debt contracts

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 16 Sep 2021
Judson Caskey, Kanyuan (Kevin) Huang and Daniel Saavedra
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Accounting Area, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 68 (419,728)

Abstract:

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Debt contracting, voting rule, syndicated loan