Francis Bloch

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

54, boulevard Raspail

Paris, 75006

France

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)

Centre de la Vieille Charité

2, rue de la Charité

Marseille, 13002

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

18

DOWNLOADS
Rank 11,541

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 11,541

in Total Papers Downloads

5,404

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 2,861

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,861

in Total Papers Citations

106

CROSSREF CITATIONS

365

Scholarly Papers (18)

1.

Centrality Measures in Networks

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 19 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2021
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch, Matthew O. Jackson and Pietro Tebaldi
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Stanford University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 2,353 (7,725)
Citation 39

Abstract:

Loading...

Centrality, prestige, power, influence, networks, social networks, rankings, centrality measures

2.

Optimal Ownership Structures in Asymmetric Joint Ventures

Queen Mary & Westfield College Economics Working Paper No. 411
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 11 Sep 2000
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 571 (61,433)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Joint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries

3.

Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 20 Apr 2016
Vijayendra Rao, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 438 (85,068)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Loading...

4.

Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 03 Jun 2013
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Ulrich Hege
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 356 (107,847)
Citation 32

Abstract:

Loading...

multiple shareholders, corporate control, contestability, block trading

5.
Downloads 331 (116,989)
Citation 25

Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks

U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper No. 443
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 25 Oct 2001
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 316 (122,211)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

market sharing, collusion, economic networks, oligopoly, auctions

Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 02 Jun 2004
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 15 (710,945)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

6.

The Formation of Networks with Transfers Among Players

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Matthew O. Jackson, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
Stanford University - Department of Economics and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 196 (197,122)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Loading...

Networks, Network games, Network formation, Game theory, Efficient networks, Side payments, Transfers, Bargaining, Externalities

7.

Informal Insurance in Social Networks

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 14 Dec 2005
Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 174 (218,893)
Citation 23

Abstract:

Loading...

social network, risk-sharing, reciprocity networks, norms, informal insurance

Dynamic Protection of Innovations Through Patents and Trade Secrets

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 Dec 2013
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 94 (352,148)

Abstract:

Loading...

patents, trade secrets, dynamic protection of innovation, intellectual property rights

Dynamic Protection of Innovations Through Patents and Trade Secrets

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 12 Dec 2014
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 78 (392,684)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

patents, trade secrets, dynamic protection of innovation, intellectual property rights

The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 04 Jan 2005
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Ünal Zenginobuz
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Bogazici University - Department of Economics
Downloads 92 (354,614)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Local Public Goods, Positive Spillovers, Equilibrium

The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods

Review of Economic Design, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 10 Oct 2006
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Ünal Zenginobuz
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Bogazici University - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (507,170)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

local public goods, positive spillovers, equilibrium

10.

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch, Armando R. Gomes and Armando R. Gomes
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolWashington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School
Downloads 129 (278,973)
Citation 160

Abstract:

Loading...

Outside options, Externalities, Coalitional bargaining

11.

Agenda Control in Coalition Formation

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 23 Jun 2000
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Stephane Rottier
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Department of Economics
Downloads 115 (303,256)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Coalition formation, agenda control, government formation

12.

Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/65
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 Sep 2006
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Axel Gautier
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and University of Liège - Research Center on Public and Population Economics
Downloads 104 (325,076)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

access, bypass, postal sector

13.

Tiebout Equilibria in Local Public Good Economies with Spillovers

QREQAM Working Paper No. 2004-41
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 04 Jan 2005
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Ünal Zenginobuz
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Bogazici University - Department of Economics
Downloads 103 (327,154)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

local public goods, spillovers, Tiebout equilibrium

14.

Market Formation in Bilateral Oligopolies

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 03 Apr 2000
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Helene Ferrer
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 74 (400,365)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

strategic market games, trade agglomeration, bilateral oligopolies, market formation

15.

Expectation Formation Rules and the Core of Partition Function Games

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 May 2013
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and University of Oregon - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (498,027)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Partition Function Games, Core, Expectation Formation, Axiomatization

16.

Sustainable Collusion on Separate Markets

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/59
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 28 Aug 2006
Paul Belleflamme, Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 44 (511,284)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Implicit collusion, market sharing agreements, production quotas, optimal punishment

17.

Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 12 Nov 2002
Francis Bloch and Francis Bloch
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Downloads 32 (571,710)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

18.

Cores of Combined Games

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 19 Mar 2009
Francis Bloch, Francis Bloch and Geoffroy de Clippel
University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Brown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (607,938)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Cooperative Games, Core, Additivity, Issue Linkage, Multi Issue Bargaining.