Laura Doval

Columbia University

420 West 118th Street

New York, NY 10027

United States

http://www.laura-doval.com

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

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658

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 36,718

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Top 36,718

in Total Papers Citations

7

CROSSREF CITATIONS

14

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.
Downloads 247 (169,564)
Citation 3

Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 07 May 2019 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2020
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 247 (168,983)
Citation 3

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mechanism design, limited commitment, intrapersonal equilibrium, information design, self-generation, posted price

Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13967
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 07 Oct 2019
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
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information design, intrapersonal equilibrium, Limited Commitment, mechanism design, posted price, self-generation

2.

Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 03 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 25 Aug 2020
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 226 (184,574)
Citation 11

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mechanism design, limited commitment, revelation principle, information design

Purchase History and Product Personalization

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 23 Mar 2021
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
Downloads 104 (348,236)

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product-line design, price discrimination, dynamic mechanism design, information design, limited commitment

Purchase History and Product Personalization

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15969
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 31 Mar 2021
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
Columbia University and University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics
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4.

Dynamically Stable Matching

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 12 Jul 2019
Laura Doval
Columbia University
Downloads 70 (438,006)
Citation 5

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dynamic stability, dynamic matching, stable matching, non-transferable utility, externalities, credibility, market design, dynamic arrivals, aftermarkets

5.

The Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides

NBER Working Paper No. w27087
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 05 May 2020 Last Revised: 05 Jan 2022
Princeton University, Columbia University, Princeton University - Department of Economics, Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) and MIT
Downloads 6 (804,905)

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6.

On the Efficiency of Queueing in Dynamic Matching Markets

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Apr 2022
Laura Doval and Balazs Szentes
Columbia University and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics
Downloads 4 (833,797)

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dynamic matching, queueing, first come first served, discounting, flow costs

7.

Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16543
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Laura Doval and Alex Smolin
Columbia University and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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Bayesian persuasion, information design, interim payoffs, reputation

8.

The Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14666
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 08 May 2020
affiliation not provided to SSRN, Columbia University, Princeton University - Department of Economics, Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) and MIT
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Citation 1
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