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mechanism design, limited commitment, intrapersonal equilibrium, information design, self-generation, posted price
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information design, intrapersonal equilibrium, Limited Commitment, mechanism design, posted price, self-generation
mechanism design, limited commitment, revelation principle, information design
product-line design, price discrimination, dynamic mechanism design, information design, limited commitment
dynamic stability, dynamic matching, stable matching, non-transferable utility, externalities, credibility, market design, dynamic arrivals, aftermarkets
dynamic matching, queueing, first come first served, discounting, flow costs
Bayesian persuasion, information design, interim payoffs, reputation
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