Claudia M. Landeo

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Professor of Economics

Henry Marshall Tory Building 7-25

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4

Canada

http://sites.google.com/a/ualberta.ca/claudia-m-landeo-s-home-page/home

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

24

DOWNLOADS

6,652

SSRN CITATIONS

40

CROSSREF CITATIONS

85

Ideas:
“  My research is focused on the Economic Analysis of Law. I apply game-theoretic modeling, mechanism design, experimental economics methods, and legal analysis to the assessment and design of market and legal institutions. My theoretical work on the economic analysis of legal disputes, published in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2018), generalizes seminal economic models of litigation, presents the first formal definition of "Access to Justice," and provides methodological contributions to the economic analysis of law. My theoretical work on the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms with ordered leniency, published in the JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2020), extends seminal work on the control of harmful externalities and provides the first formal analysis of enforcement policies with ordered leniency for short-term harmful group activities.  ”

Scholarly Papers (24)

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

American Economic Review, Forthcoming, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 604, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 28 Dec 2009
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 832 (36,948)
Citation 2

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Bargaining with Externalities, Contracting with Externalities, Experiments, Exclusive Dealing, Antitrust, Discrimination, Endogenous Payoffs, Communication, Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 22 Jun 2008 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2021
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 178 (215,231)
Citation 2

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2.

Shotguns and Deadlocks

Yale Journal on Regulation, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 May 2013 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 802 (39,440)
Citation 4

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Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlocks, General Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, Closely-Held Business Entities, Shotgun Provisions, Buy-Sell Clauses, Cake-Cutting Mechanisms, Bargaining with Common Values, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 630
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 17 Apr 2009
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
New York University School of Law, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 525 (67,767)
Citation 2

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Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-41, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 10 Jul 2009 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2011
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
New York University School of Law, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 235 (166,267)
Citation 6

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Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 649-673, 2010
Posted: 09 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2011
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
New York University School of Law, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty

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Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Categories

4.

Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock

University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 545 (65,337)
Citation 1

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judicial resolution of business deadlocks, general partnerships, limited liability companies, closely-held business entities, Shotgun provisions, buy-sell clauses, cake-cutting mechanisms, auctions, bargaining with common values, asymmetric information, experiments

5.

Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions

Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum (eds.), The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 21 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 02 Mar 2015
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 414 (91,294)

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Vertical Restraints, Experimental Law and Economics, Antitrust, Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing Contracts; Bundling; Tying; Communication; Intentionality, Fairness, Reciprocity, Discrimination, Endogenous Payoffs, Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Economic Expert Testimony

6.

Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 29 May 2014 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 337 (115,020)
Citation 2

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Teams, Effort Complementarity, Principal -- Multi-Agent Framework, Moral Hazard in Teams, Team Cooperation, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag-Hunt Games, Infinitely-Repeated Games, Communication, Reciprocity, Experiments

7.

Cognitive Coherence and Tort Reform

Journal of Economic Psychology, Forthcoming, 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Feb 2007 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2009
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 323 (120,382)
Citation 4

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Tort Reform, Belief Formation, Split-Award Statute, Coherence-Based Reasoning, Role-Specific Bias, Self-Serving Bias, Motivated Reasoning, Settlement, Litigation, Experiments, Debiasing through Law, Experiments

8.

Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes

Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 23 Feb 2018
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 307 (127,085)
Citation 1

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Civil Litigation; Access to Justice; Social Welfare; Financially-Constrained Lawyers; Asymmetric Information; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Deterrence; Lawsuits; Settlement; Litigation; Third-Party Lawyer Lending Industry; Third-Party Litigation Funding

9.
Downloads 244 (160,815)
Citation 2

Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-20
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 10 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 17 Sep 2018
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 230 (169,788)

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Law Enforcement, Ordered Leniency, Self-Reporting, Leniency, Harmful Externalities, Non-Cooperative Games, Prisoners' Dilemma Game, Coordination Game, Risk Dominance, Pareto Dominance, Corporate Misconduct, White-Collar Crime, Insider Trading, Plea Bargaining, Whistleblowers, Tax Evasion

Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 01 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2021
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 10 (755,004)
Citation 2

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Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency

The Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 15 Aug 2019
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 4 (806,276)

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Law Enforcement, Ordered Leniency, Self-Reporting, Leniency, Harmful Externalities, Non-Cooperative Games, Prisoners' Dilemma Game, Coordination Game, Risk Dominance, Pareto Dominance, Corporate Misconduct, White-Collar Crime, Insider Trading, Plea Bargaining, Whistleblowers, Tax Policy Enforcement

Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 10 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 04 Mar 2018
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management
Downloads 219 (178,036)
Citation 2

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Settlement, bargaining, litigation, asymmetric information, experiments

Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 03 May 2006 Last Revised: 04 Mar 2018
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management
Downloads 11 (746,477)
Citation 1

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Settlement; Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

11.

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Sep 2011
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 228 (171,675)
Citation 2

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Exclusive Dealing, Coordination Games, Experiments, Contracting with Externalities, Bargaining with Externalities, Social Preferences, Reciprocity, Intentionality, Regard for Others, Social Proximity, Antitrust

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 26 Nov 2004
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 226 (172,729)
Citation 7

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Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care and Litigation Outcomes

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 08 May 2006
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics

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Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 10 Sep 2004
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law
Downloads 222 (175,717)
Citation 3

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Deterrence, punitive damage awards, bargaining, asymmetric information, court errors

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 2007
Posted: 03 May 2006
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law

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Deterrence, Punitive Damage Awards, Bargaining, Asymmetric Information, Court Errors

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 57-97, 2007
Posted: 17 Jun 2008
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics

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14.

Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Economics Letters, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 20 Sep 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 189 (204,165)

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Business Deadlock, Shotgun Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

15.

Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments

Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum (eds.), The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 16 Dec 2014
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 188 (205,108)
Citation 1

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Law and Economics, Experimental Law and Economics, Scientific Method, Civil Litigation, Institutional Design, Settlement, Litigation, Asymmetric Information, Self-Serving Bias, Pretrial Bargaining, Incentives for Care, Experiments, Caps on Non-Economic Damages, Motivated Reasoning, Divergent Beliefs

16.

Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 19 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 12 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 152 (245,851)

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Stipulated Damages; Rent Extraction; Market Foreclosure; Renegotiation; Social Preferences; Experiments

17.

Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform under Self-Serving Bias

Forthcoming in Thomas Miceli and Mathew Baker (eds.), The Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 22 Oct 2012
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and New Economic School
Downloads 140 (262,617)

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Settlement, Litigation, Incentives for Care, Self-Serving Bias, Tort Reform, Damage Caps, Asymmetric Information, Apparent Opponents, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Motivated Reasoning, Divergent Beliefs, Universal Divinity Refinement, Motivated Anchoring, Non-Cooperative Games, Disputes

18.

Dollarization, Financial Intermediation and Real Activity: The Inflation Threshold

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 17 Aug 2005
Claudia M. Landeo, Gaetano Antinolfi and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 127 (282,873)

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Dollarization, Inflation, Financial Intermediation

19.

Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 101 (332,139)

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Labor Relations Laws, Social Welfare, Bargaining Impasse, Replacement Teachers Laws, Intermittent Strikes Laws, Non-Cooperative Games, Asymmetric Information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 18 Sep 2018
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 80 (387,758)

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Law Enforcement, Ordered Leniency, Self-Reporting, Experiments, Leniency, Coordination Game, Prisoners' Dilemma Game, Risk Dominance, Pareto Dominance, Equilibrium Selection, Non-Cooperative Games, Harmful Externalities, Corporate Misconduct, White-Collar Crime, Plea Bargaining

Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 01 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 26 Jul 2021
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 3 (815,197)

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21.

Dollarization and the Inflation Threshold

Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 628-649, May 2007
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 19 May 2007
Gaetano Antinolfi, Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 24 (622,763)
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22.

Dollarization and the Inflation Threshold - Dollarisation Et Seuil D'Inflation

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, Vol. 40, Issue 2, pp. 628-649, 2007
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 May 2020
Gaetano Antinolfi, Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
Washington University in St. Louis, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 0 (819,697)
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23.

Incentives and Contract Frames: Comment

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 10 Sep 2011
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty

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Contract Frames, Incentives, Experiments

24.

Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game

Posted: 27 Nov 2004
Claudia M. Landeo and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

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Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Uncertainty, Experiments