Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
R. Miguel Lupi, 20
Lisbon, 1200
Portugal
Rua Miguel Lupi, 20
Lisboa, 1200-781
Indiana University
ISEG - Technical University of Lisbon
UECE - Research Unit in Economics and Complexity
Multi-Market Collusion, Antitrust Policy, Strategic Prosecution, International Antitrust Agreements
collusion, mergers, antitrust policy, unilateral and coordinated effects
Vertical product differentiation, network externalities, quality improvement
inter-firm heterogeneity, submodular games, business strategy, innovation strategies
technology adoption, network externalities, global game, hysteresis
Tax morale, Information, Tax evasion, Experiment, Peer Effects
Compatibility, vertical
tax morale, information, tax evasion, experiment, peer effects
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Experiment, Information, peer effects, tax evasion, Tax morale