V. Bhaskar

University College London

Gower Street

London

United Kingdom

  • University College London

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

16

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1,173

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29

CROSSREF CITATIONS

42

Scholarly Papers (16)

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1.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 266 (157,716)
Citation 1

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

2.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 144 (273,287)

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Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

3.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 116 (321,158)
Citation 3

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Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

4.

Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination

Downloads 106 (341,792)
Citation 1

Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 12 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 16 Oct 2008
Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven
University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine, University College London and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 102 (353,140)
Citation 2

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beauty premium, discrimination

Insidious Discrimination? Disentangling the Beauty Premium on a Game Show

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6276
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 22 May 2007
Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven
University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine, University College London and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 4 (858,398)
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Beauty premium, discrimination

5.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 100 (355,168)
Citation 4

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Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

6.

Social Preferences in the Public Arena: Evidence from a Prisoner's Dilemma Game on a TV Show

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-15
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Dec 2006
Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven
University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine, University College London and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 90 (379,535)
Citation 3

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prisoner's dilemma, social preferences, inequity aversion, cheap talk, gender differences

7.

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private

ISER Discussion Paper No. 942
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 31 Jul 2015
Masaki Aoyagi, V. Bhaskar and Guillaume R. Frechette
Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), University College London and New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics
Downloads 82 (401,335)
Citation 8

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Infinitely repeated games, monitoring, perfect, public, private, experiments

8.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 80 (407,031)
Citation 9

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

9.

Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 20 Oct 2008
Michèle Belot, V. Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven
University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine, University College London and University of Amsterdam
Downloads 79 (409,976)
Citation 10

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trust, promises, Bayesian updating, detecting deception, martingale property of beliefs

10.

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 16-013
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 01 Sep 2016
V. Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University College London and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (481,568)
Citation 2

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

11.

Partial Privatization and Yardstick Competition: Evidence from Employment Dynamics in Bangladesh

Economics of Transition, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 459-477, July 2006
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 29 Jun 2006
V. Bhaskar, Bishnupriya Gupta and Mushtaq Khan
University College London, University of Warwick - Department of Economics and University of London - School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
Downloads 27 (635,807)

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12.

Were American Parents Really Selfish? Child Labour in the 19th Century

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5675
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Aug 2006
V. Bhaskar and Bishnupriya Gupta
University College London and University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (701,377)
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Child labour, parental altruism

13.

Parental Sex Selection and Gender Balance

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6876
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Aug 2008
V. Bhaskar
University College London
Downloads 5 (814,923)
Citation 1
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congestion externality, gender bias, marriage market, sex ratio, sex selection

14.

Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8948
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 25 May 2012
V. Bhaskar
University College London
Downloads 2 (846,498)
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learning, moral hazard

15.

The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10619
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 27 May 2015
V. Bhaskar
University College London
Downloads 0 (878,334)
Citation 2
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dowry, marriage markets, marriage squeeze, sex ratio, stable matching

16.

Dynamic Countervailing Power Under Public and Private Monitoring

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9526
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 02 Jul 2013
V. Bhaskar
University College London
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Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, dynamic games, imperfect monitoring, strategic buyer