A. Mitchell Polinsky

Stanford Law School

Josephine Scott Crocker Professor of Law and Economics

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

49

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Top 1,168

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278

CROSSREF CITATIONS

765

Scholarly Papers (49)

1.

Economic Analysis of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 316, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 536
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 3,697 (3,621)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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law and economics, property law, liability for accidents, contract law, litigation, public enforcement, criminal law

2.
Downloads 1,787 ( 12,006)
Citation 46

The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 30 May 1998
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,691 (12,861)
Citation 47

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The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 26 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 12 Aug 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 96 (344,655)

Abstract:

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3.

The Uneasy Case for Product Liability

Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 381, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 647, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-46
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 07 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 03 Dec 2009
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,250 (20,841)
Citation 5

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4.
Downloads 1,096 ( 25,321)
Citation 9

Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Journal of Public Economics
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,036 (27,022)
Citation 11

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Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Jul 2000 Last Revised: 12 Oct 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 60 (452,591)

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5.

Principal-Agent Liability

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 02 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 976 (29,883)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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principal-agent liability, optimal liability

6.
Downloads 964 ( 30,472)
Citation 63

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, eds., Vol. 1, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 529, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 313, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 115, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 119
Number of pages: 82 Posted: 17 Nov 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 877 (34,230)

Abstract:

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public enforcement of law, fines, imprisonment, strict liability, fault-based liability, probability of detection, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, fairness of sanctions, norms

The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Number of pages: 82 Posted: 19 Feb 2006 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 87 (367,071)
Citation 21

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7.
Downloads 662 ( 50,776)
Citation 15

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 327, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 564
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Oct 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 616 (55,120)

Abstract:

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product risk, information, mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure, negligence, strict liability

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2007
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 46 (511,337)
Citation 4

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8.

Public Enforcement of Law

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 322
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 16 May 2006
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 626 (54,708)
Citation 20

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Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 597 (57,337)
Citation 5

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Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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litigation, conflict of interest between lawyers and clients, trial versus settlement, hourly fee, contingent fee, compensation of lawyers

10.

Law Enforcement Using Imprisonment

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 09 Jun 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 465 (79,106)

Abstract:

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law enforcement, imprisonment, sanctions, crime, jail term

The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

Stanford Law School, Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 167; and Harvard Law School, Olin Discussion Paper No. 247
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 08 Mar 1999
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 392 (95,775)
Citation 3

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The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy

American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 223-237, 2000; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 167; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 247
Posted: 07 Jul 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 313 (123,304)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers

Posted: 30 May 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

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litigation, contingent fee, lawyer compensation, trial versus settlement, conflict of interest between lawyer and client

13.
Downloads 301 (129,329)
Citation 3

Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 436, Harvard Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 739 , Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper No. 13-06
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 12 Feb 2013
Steven Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky
Harvard Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 289 (134,336)

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Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 07 Dec 2012 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 12 (735,849)

Abstract:

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Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Dec 2003
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 259 (150,438)

Abstract:

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price fixing, antitrust remedies, coupons, discounts, deadweight loss

Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2003 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 32 (585,458)
Citation 1

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The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, Nos. 4-5, pp. 823-835, 2006, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 290
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 209 (185,392)

Abstract:

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Fines, Imprisonment, Public enforcement, Penalties, Unobservable wealth

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 29 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 29 May 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 27 (617,845)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Aug 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 198 (194,972)

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fines, auditing, public enforcement, penalties, misrepresentation of wealth

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 27 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 27 Nov 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 31 (591,533)
Citation 1

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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 01 Feb 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 198 (194,972)
Citation 2

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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Apr 2002 Last Revised: 27 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 24 (639,634)

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Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1996.
Posted: 04 Mar 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

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18.

The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 25 Aug 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 158 (237,273)
Citation 15

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19.
Downloads 157 (238,558)
Citation 3

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 17 Mar 2005
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 131 (276,529)

Abstract:

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class action remedies, coupons, damage revelation, accuracy

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 May 2005 Last Revised: 07 Mar 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 26 (624,937)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 3, pp. 653-661, 2007
Posted: 23 Jun 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract:

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20.

Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior

International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 478
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 21 Jun 2015
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 147 (251,674)
Citation 3

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imprisonment, parole, prison costs, prisoner behavior, deterrence, sanctions

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 506, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 17-04
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 29 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 05 Apr 2018
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 118 (298,880)

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insurance, subrogation, accidents, torts, litigation, loading costs, moral hazard, non-monetary losses

Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 05 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 04 Sep 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 28 (611,062)

Abstract:

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Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 507
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 16 May 2017 Last Revised: 12 Dec 2018
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 122 (291,808)

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Crime, Imprisonment, Parole, Probation, Prison Costs, Deterrence, Sanctions

Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 May 2017 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul N. Riskind
Stanford Law School and Stanford Law School
Downloads 12 (735,849)

Abstract:

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23.

Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Aug 2004 Last Revised: 16 Jun 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 90 (356,258)

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24.

A Skeptical Attitude about Product Liability is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 399
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 09 Oct 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 89 (358,776)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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product liability, public policy, benefit-cost analysis

25.

Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 27 Feb 2001 Last Revised: 15 Nov 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 86 (366,502)
Citation 6

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26.

On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Jul 2000 Last Revised: 09 Aug 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 70 (412,236)

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27.

A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 07 Oct 2000 Last Revised: 20 Sep 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 67 (422,054)
Citation 2

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Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 05 Sep 2000 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 57 (464,311)
Citation 2

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Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?

Posted: 04 May 2000
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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29.

Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: a Study in Risk Allocation

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 03 May 2004
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 54 (468,552)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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30.

The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 25 Aug 2000 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 53 (472,533)

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31.

Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market Setting

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 04 Jul 2004 Last Revised: 27 Aug 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 52 (476,533)
Citation 6

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32.

Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 11 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 19 Jul 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 52 (476,533)
Citation 1

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33.

Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 28 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 51 (480,631)
Citation 1

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34.

Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 18 Aug 2004 Last Revised: 14 Jul 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 49 (488,816)

Abstract:

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35.
Downloads 46 (501,941)
Citation 2

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 500
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Jan 2017
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 38 (551,288)

Abstract:

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deterrence, imprisonment, prison work programs, prison costs, prison labor

Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 11 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 8 (770,222)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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36.

On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 19 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 46 (501,941)

Abstract:

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37.

The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 28 Jan 2002 Last Revised: 11 Jul 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 43 (515,311)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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38.

Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 25 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 06 Jun 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 40 (529,527)
Citation 2

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39.

Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 25 Aug 2000 Last Revised: 07 Jun 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che
Stanford Law School and Columbia University
Downloads 38 (539,400)
Citation 22

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40.

Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 27 Jun 2004 Last Revised: 26 Jul 2010
A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson
Stanford Law School and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (549,638)
Citation 4

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Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 535, American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 26 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 01 Sep 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 34 (573,639)

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Deterrence, imprisonment, sentence adjustment, sanctions, parole, recidivism

Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 23 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1 (837,300)

Abstract:

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42.

A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 28 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 01 Nov 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 35 (554,886)

Abstract:

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43.

A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 Dec 2006 Last Revised: 13 Oct 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 31 (576,765)

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44.

Optimal Liability When the Injurer's Information About the Victim's Loss is Imperfect

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 10 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Downloads 24 (620,887)

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45.

Optimal Cleanup and Liability after Environmentally Harmful Discharges

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 01 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 31 May 2021
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 20 (648,936)

Abstract:

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46.

The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges

The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 402-417, June 2008
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 14 Jul 2008
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Stanford Law School and University of California at Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 3 (779,675)
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47.

Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis

111 Harvard Law Review, 1998.
Posted: 15 Sep 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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48.

Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg Et Al.

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1997).
Posted: 09 May 1997
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School

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49.

Repeat Offenders and the Theory of Deterrence

John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 134
Posted: 16 Dec 1996
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School

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