The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes and Public Services

World Politics, Vol. 57, pp. 530-567, July 2005

38 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2008

Abstract

Using data from approximately ninety countries, the author shows that the more a state taxes the rich as a percentage of GDP, the more it protects property rights; and the more it taxes the poor, the more it provides basic public services. There is no evidence that states gouge the rich to benefit the poor or vice versa, contrary to state-capture theories. Nor is there any evidence that taxes and spending are unrelated, contrary to state-autonomy models. Instead, states operate much like fiscal contracts, with groups getting what they pay for.

Keywords: states, taxes, public services

JEL Classification: H2, H11, H41

Suggested Citation

Timmons, Jeffrey F., The Fiscal Contract: States, Taxes and Public Services. World Politics, Vol. 57, pp. 530-567, July 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1250982

Jeffrey F. Timmons (Contact Author)

NYU Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
(971) 262 84523 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/academics/faculty/jeffrey-timmons.html

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