Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress

Posted: 10 Sep 1998

See all articles by David Epstein

David Epstein

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Abstract

Gilligan and Krebbiel (1989) analyse bipartisanship in committees through a model in which committee ideal points are exactly symmetric about the floor's ideal point. This article has three objectives: it shows that the Gilligan and Krebbiel equilibrium does not generalize to asymmetric committee members; it proves that a similar equilibrium can be supported when the majority party committee member has gatekeeping power; and it compares this equilibrium to the one-signaler case to show that when partisan differences over policy are small, or when the uncertainty associated with a policy area is large, bipartisanship will be preferred to partisan policy making.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Epstein, David Lester, Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=125748

David Lester Epstein (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

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