Political Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls

50 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2008

See all articles by Lee L. Lane

Lee L. Lane

American Enterprise Institute (AEI)

David Montgomery

Charles River Associates, Incorporated

Date Written: November 5, 2008

Abstract

Research and insights taken from the field of political economy suggest that institutions limit the extent to which efficient policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be adopted. High transaction costs among nations, as well as domestic constraints like voter xenophobia and distrust of markets in the U.S. and ineffective legal and economic institutions in China, discourage international agreement. The U.S. must focus upon limiting economic harm from adopting poorly designed policies and developing strategies for adaptation or technology-driven geoengineering. Most importantly, the lessons of political economy must become central to the study of climate policy, including a healthy exchange of views between political economists and climate modelers.

Keywords: Climage change policy, Technology, Greenhouse gas emissions, Institutional reform

Suggested Citation

Lane, Lee L. and Montgomery, David, Political Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls (November 5, 2008). Reg-Markets Center Related Publication No. 08-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1296107 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296107

Lee L. Lane (Contact Author)

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) ( email )

1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States

David Montgomery

Charles River Associates, Incorporated ( email )

1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States

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