A Comparison of the Director Networks in the Main Companies Listed in Italy, France and the United Kingdom (Una comparazione tra le reti di amministratori nelle principali societa quotate in Italia, Francia e Gran Bretagna)

L'industria, Vol. 2/2008, 2008

Posted: 17 Jan 2009

See all articles by Paolo Santella

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano"

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Enrico Gagliardi

Luiss Guido Carli University

Date Written: June 30, 2008

Abstract

The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on country interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships in the first 40 Italian, French and British Blue Chips as of December 2007 (Italy/March 2008 (France and UK). The theoretical literature identifies among the possible explanations for interlocking directorships the reduction of information asymmetries between debtors and their creditors and suppliers and the collusion among players in the same market. Our findings show two different national models, the British one and the French-Italian one. The first model is characterised by a limited number of companies linked with each other through just one director at the time; the second model by a higher number of companies that often share several directors at the time and seem to operate under mutual scrutiny.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Interlocking directorships, Antitrust, Competition, Social Network Analysis (SNA), Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA), Empirical Corporate Finance

JEL Classification: C00, L10, L40, G30, M20

Suggested Citation

Santella, Paolo and Drago, Carlo and Polo, Andrea and Gagliardi, Enrico, A Comparison of the Director Networks in the Main Companies Listed in Italy, France and the United Kingdom (Una comparazione tra le reti di amministratori nelle principali societa quotate in Italia, Francia e Gran Bretagna) (June 30, 2008). L'industria, Vol. 2/2008, 2008 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1327772

Paolo Santella (Contact Author)

Single Resolution Board

Rue de la Science 27
Bruxelles, 1000
Belgium

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano" ( email )

Via Don Carlo Gnocchi, 3
Rome, 00166
Italy

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
Parma, 43100 - I
Italy

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Enrico Gagliardi

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

viale Pola 12
Roma, Roma 00198
Italy

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