A Comparison of the Director Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States

18 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2009 Last revised: 4 Sep 2009

See all articles by Paolo Santella

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano"

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Enrico Gagliardi

Luiss Guido Carli University

Date Written: January 20, 2009

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through directors who have no more than two board positions at the time. A case in between is represented by the US, where a high number of companies are connected to each other just like Germany, France, and Italy. However, just like the UK, such connections are made through directors who tend to have just two board positions at the time, a sign that, differently from Italy, Germany, and France, the UK and US networks might not be functional to systemic collusion.

Keywords: corporate governance, interlocking directorships, antitrust, competition, social network analysis (SNA), exploratory data analysis (EDA), empirical corporate finance

JEL Classification: C0, L1, L4, G3, M2

Suggested Citation

Santella, Paolo and Drago, Carlo and Polo, Andrea and Gagliardi, Enrico, A Comparison of the Director Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States (January 20, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1437087 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1437087

Paolo Santella (Contact Author)

Single Resolution Board

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Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano" ( email )

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Rome, 00166
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Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

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Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

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Italy

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
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Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Enrico Gagliardi

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

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Roma, Roma 00198
Italy

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