Economic Consequences of Constitutions: A Theory and Survey

Journal des Economistes and des Etudes Humaines, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 3-42, March 2004

40 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2009

See all articles by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

University of Copenhagen

Niclas Berggren

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

One of the major questions in economics is what causes the growth of wealth. What explains that some countries experience higher economic growth than others and hence, ultimately, that some countries are rich, while others are poor? The idea here is to explore the link between political institutions, on the one hand, where the constitution is at the center of our interest, and economic performance, on the other. Is it the case that certain sets of institutions are more conducive to economic growth and sound fiscal affairs than others by influencing the way political decision-makers act? If so, which are these institutions? The present paper presents both a theoretical analysis of these issues, as well as the results from a number of real-world studies.

Keywords: constitutions, institutions, growth

JEL Classification: O43

Suggested Citation

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter and Berggren, Niclas, Economic Consequences of Constitutions: A Theory and Survey (2004). Journal des Economistes and des Etudes Humaines, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 3-42, March 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1491473

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Dept. of Political Science
Øster Farimagsgade 5, P.O.Box 2099
Copenhagen, DK-1014
Denmark
+45 35 32 37 98 (Phone)
+45 35 32 33 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kurrild-klitgaard.net

Niclas Berggren (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/nb

University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration ( email )

nám. W. Churchilla 4
Praha, 130 67
Czech Republic

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