A Note on the Regulation of Executive Compensation within the 2009 US (Bailout)

International Journal of Regulation and Governance, December 2009

8 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2009 Last revised: 21 Mar 2011

Date Written: March 1, 2009

Abstract

This paper discusses the design and analyzes the potential benefits and costs of executive pay package policy within the US 2009 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), commonly known "Bailout". It shows that the ultimate effect of the EESA on executive compensation is generally difficult to predict. Moreover, this paper differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, and executive pay package caps

JEL Classification: G1, G2, J3, K2, L5, M5

Suggested Citation

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, A Note on the Regulation of Executive Compensation within the 2009 US (Bailout) (March 1, 2009). International Journal of Regulation and Governance, December 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1515508

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.harvard.edu/haidar

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
95
Abstract Views
552
rank
350,777
PlumX Metrics