Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, Vol. 167, No. 1, pp. 126-142

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-14

17 Pages Posted: 20 May 2010 Last revised: 20 Nov 2012

See all articles by Gregory J. Werden

Gregory J. Werden

Independent

Luke M. Froeb

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

Mikhael Shor

University of Connecticut Department of Economics

Date Written: May 20, 2010

Abstract

Scholarship on competition policy has begun to explore the implications of learning from behavioral research and to challenge the assumption of profit maximization at the heart of neoclassical economic theory of the firm. This scholarship is briefly reviewed, focusing on merger control. Prospects for basing merger control entirely on data from actual mergers or laboratory experiments are explored. Also explored are implications of behavioral research for merger assessment in consumer goods industries. The conclusion is that competition policy should continue to rely on neoclassical economic analysis based on the assumption of profit maximization.

Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Antitrust, Mergers

JEL Classification: K 21, L41

Suggested Citation

Werden, Gregory J. and Froeb, Luke M. and Shor, Mikhael, Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control (May 20, 2010). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2011, Vol. 167, No. 1, pp. 126-142, Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1612282

Luke M. Froeb

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

Mikhael Shor

University of Connecticut Department of Economics ( email )

365 Fairfield Way, U-1063
Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mikeshor.com/

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