Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems

Posted: 10 Aug 1999

See all articles by Efe A. Ok

Efe A. Ok

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Lin Zhou

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that while no continuous choice function can satisfy strong Pareto optimality over the class of all compact and comprehensive choice problems, strong Pareto optimality, Arrow's choice axiom, upper hemicontinuity and a weak compromisation postulate turn out to be necessary and sufficient to represent choice correspondences by continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave real-valued functions. Some applications of our main findings to axiomatic bargaining theory are also studied.

JEL Classification: D71, C78

Suggested Citation

Ok, Efe A. and Zhou, Lin, Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=161377

Efe A. Ok (Contact Author)

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-8920 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)

Lin Zhou

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States

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