The Determinants of Music Piracy in a Sample of College Students

39 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2010

See all articles by Marc F. Bellemare

Marc F. Bellemare

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Applied Economics

Andrew M. Holmberg

US Department of Justice; Government of the United States of America - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 16, 2010

Abstract

Why do some individuals pay for digital music while others pirate it? Using data on a sample of undergraduate students, we study the determinants of music piracy by looking at whether a respondent’s last song was obtained illegally. We first elicit our respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for digital music using a simple field experiment. We then use our respondents’ WTP to control for the preference heterogeneity between respondents and find that (i) a respondent’s subjective probability of facing a lawsuit; and (ii) her degree of morality both have a negative impact on the likelihood that her last song was obtained illegally. Our results are robust to whether WTP is estimated parametrically or nonparametrically. We conclude by discussing the practical implications of our findings.

Keywords: Music Piracy, File Sharing, Transaction Costs

JEL Classification: D12, D23, L86, K11, K42

Suggested Citation

Bellemare, Marc F. and Holmberg, Andrew M. and Holmberg, Andrew M., The Determinants of Music Piracy in a Sample of College Students (May 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1633430 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1633430

Marc F. Bellemare (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Applied Economics ( email )

MN
United States

Andrew M. Holmberg

Government of the United States of America - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ( email )

935 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20535-0001
United States

US Department of Justice ( email )

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
Abstract Views
751
rank
28,380
PlumX Metrics