Tullock on Motivated Inquiry: Expert-Induced Uncertainty Disguised as Risk

31 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2010

See all articles by David M. Levy

David M. Levy

George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice

Sandra J. Peart

University of Richmond - Jepson School of Leadership Studies

Date Written: August 18, 2010

Abstract

Gordon Tullock denied the scientific status to economics because economists can trade results with the subject of our analysis, e.g., “you can have a low estimate for nothing but a high one will cost you something.” We suppose this to be the fate all disciplines in which the results matter to those we study. When the trading is non-transparent then there is no reason to believe that the sampling distribution of the estimates will be what it is believed to be. To the extent these estimates are employed in decision making we face the problem of uncertainty which we believe to be risky. The ludicrous number of AAA ratings of securities is case in point. Taking trading between experts and subjects as inevitable, we propose to ask if the trade is fair. When scientific unanimity fails, can a Rawlsian unanimity replace it?

Keywords: Gordon Tullock, expert-induced uncertainty, motivated inquiry, analytical egalitarianism

JEL Classification: B11, B31, N23

Suggested Citation

Levy, David M. and Peart, Sandra J., Tullock on Motivated Inquiry: Expert-Induced Uncertainty Disguised as Risk (August 18, 2010). Public Choice, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1661207

David M. Levy (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice ( email )

MSN 1d3 Carow Hall
4400 University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Sandra J. Peart

University of Richmond - Jepson School of Leadership Studies ( email )

Jepson Hall
Richmond, VA 23173
United States

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