'Drinking Poison to Quench Thirst': The Discriminatory Arbitral Award Enforcement Regime under Chinese Arbitration Law

Hong Kong Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp.541-560, 2009

17 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2010 Last revised: 30 Jan 2011

See all articles by Manjiao Chi

Manjiao Chi

UIBE - Center for Int'l Economic Law & Policy (CIELP), Law School,

Date Written: March 9, 2009

Abstract

Arbitration makes sense only when the award can be enforced satisfactorily. With the development of the Chinese economy, arbitration is becoming popular in China. Despite the progress and achievements China has made, the award enforcement regime under Chinese arbitration law is seriously defective due chiefly to the out-dated “dual-track system”, unsatisfactory enforcement of the New York Convention awards and prohibition of ad hoc arbitration. These measures make Chinese arbitration law increasingly discriminatory against domestic arbitration and lower courts, and consequently hurt the competitiveness of Chinese arbitration. To ensure the healthy development of Chinese arbitration, mere amendment of legislation is not enough; rather, a full-range judicial reform is needed.

Keywords: Award Enforcement, Chinese arbitration

Suggested Citation

Chi, Manjiao, 'Drinking Poison to Quench Thirst': The Discriminatory Arbitral Award Enforcement Regime under Chinese Arbitration Law (March 9, 2009). Hong Kong Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp.541-560, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674279

Manjiao Chi (Contact Author)

UIBE - Center for Int'l Economic Law & Policy (CIELP), Law School, ( email )

10, Huixin Dongjie
Changyang District
Beijing, Beijing 100029
China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
176
Abstract Views
1,237
rank
230,850
PlumX Metrics