The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

26 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2010

See all articles by Alessandro Tavoni

Alessandro Tavoni

University of Bologna; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Maja Schlüter

Stockholm University; Leibniz-Institute of Freshwater Ecology

Simon Levin

Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology

Date Written: November 15, 2010

Abstract

This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.

Keywords: Cooperation, Social Norm, Ostracism, Common Pool Resource, Evolutionary Game Theory, Replicator Equation, Agent-based Simulation, Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics

JEL Classification: C73, Q20, D70

Suggested Citation

Tavoni, Alessandro and Schlüter, Maja and Schlüter, Maja and Levin, Simon, The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management (November 15, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 127.2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1709313 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1709313

Alessandro Tavoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna ( email )

Bologna
Italy
0512098485 (Phone)
40100 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/whosWho/Staff/AlessandroTavoni.aspx

Maja Schlüter

Stockholm University

Stockholm, SE-106 91
Sweden

Leibniz-Institute of Freshwater Ecology ( email )

Müggelseedamm 310
Berlin
Germany

Simon Levin

Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
Not Available (Phone)
Not Available (Fax)

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