Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

25 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2010

See all articles by Helder Vasconcelos

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 24, 2010


This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is two-fold. First, it shows that if mergers do not involve all firms in the industry, then merger remedies help the AA to increase consumer surplus only if assets are divested to competitors already in the market. Second, it presents a model which clarifies that there can only exist social costs to over-fixing the anticompetitive effects of a merger if merger review policy treats mergers as one-time events. When a more dynamic view is taken of sequential merger review, then there can never be an over-fixing problem. In this case, however, remedies are shown to be needed to make myopic merger review optimal.

Keywords: Endogenous mergers, Efficiency gains, Merger review policy

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L41, L51

Suggested Citation

Vasconcelos, Helder, Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control (December 24, 2010). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, Issue 4, pp. 742-766, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1732395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00436.x

Helder Vasconcelos (Contact Author)

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )

Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
4200-464 Porto, 4200-464

HOME PAGE: http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/hvasconcelos

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