Does Tort Law Reform Help or Hurt Consumers?

15 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2011

See all articles by Stephen P. King

Stephen P. King

Monash University - Department of Economics; Productivity Commission

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 23, 2010


Legal limits on insurance damage claims have been introduced in Australia, the United States and other jurisdictions. In this article, I construct a simple competitive model to analyse the effect of tort law reforms on consumers. The model shows that reforms to limit non-economic losses make consumers unambiguously worse off ex ante. Although insurance premiums fall and these reductions are passed on to consumers in full, this gain is more than offset by the increased risk that consumers are forced to bear. In contrast, reforms for income-related (i.e. economic) losses lead to ambiguous outcomes. The potential benefits from limits to economic loss arise due to the inability of insurers to price discriminate on the basis of income or expected loss. Because of this, there is an implicit cross subsidy from low- to high-income consumers that is embedded in the insurance premium and relevant product price. Tort law reforms partially unwind this cross subsidy. The results presented in this article show that tort law reforms may achieve their stated goal, such as lowering monetary prices, but can still make consumers worse off by introducing an uninsurable risk. There is also an important difference between reforms that limit claims for economic and non-economic losses. Insurance for economic loss will generally include an implicit cross subsidy and, as a consequence, reforms can alter the ex ante utility for different groups of consumers in different ways.

JEL Classification: K13, K29, L59

Suggested Citation

King, Stephen Peter, Does Tort Law Reform Help or Hurt Consumers? (November 23, 2010). Economic Record, Vol. 86, Issue 275, pp. 563-577, 2010, Available at SSRN: or

Stephen Peter King (Contact Author)

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

23 Innovation Walk
Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800

Productivity Commission ( email )

Level 28
35 Collins St.
Melbourne, Victoria, Victoria 3000

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics