Internal Controls and the Detection of Management Fraud

Posted: 5 Aug 1999

See all articles by Dennis H. Caplan

Dennis H. Caplan

Oregon State University - Department of Accounting, Finance, and Information Management

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine an auditor?s decision to investigate for fraud, when a manager with exogenous incentives to misreport chooses the quality of internal controls. I extend the strategic auditing literature by allowing the manager both a choice with respect to fraud and a second choice that affects the error rate in the audit population. Consistent with the practitioner literature, I assume managers can commit fraud by overriding internal controls, and that audits conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) do not always distinguish between errors and fraud.

JEL Classification: M49

Suggested Citation

Caplan, Dennis H., Internal Controls and the Detection of Management Fraud. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=173509

Dennis H. Caplan (Contact Author)

Oregon State University - Department of Accounting, Finance, and Information Management ( email )

Corvallis, OR 97331
United States

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