Tax Rate Harmonization, Renegotiation and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction
40 Pages Posted: 18 May 2011
Date Written: April 29, 2011
This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim-trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process generally requires more patient tax authorities to support tax harmonization as a subgame perfect equilibrium. We find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting may make international tax arrangements less sustainable under weakly-renegotiation-proof strategies.
Keywords: human capital investment, endogenous risk, learning effort, optimal taxation, public education
JEL Classification: H25, H87, F23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation