The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool

47 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2011 Last revised: 7 Oct 2021

See all articles by Orley Ashenfelter

Orley Ashenfelter

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Daniel S. Hosken

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission

Matthew Weinberg

Bryn Mawr College

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

Many experts speculate that U.S. antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers has been too lenient. We estimate the price effects of Whirlpool's acquisition of Maytag to provide new evidence on this debate. We compare price changes in appliance markets most affected by the merger to markets where concentration changed much less or not at all. We estimate price increases for dishwashers and relatively large price increases for clothes dryers, but no price effects for refrigerators or clothes washers. The combined firm's market share fell across all four affected categories and the number of distinct appliance products fell.

Suggested Citation

Ashenfelter, Orley C. and Hosken, Daniel S. and Weinberg, Matthew, The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool (October 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1940323

Orley C. Ashenfelter (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States
609-258-4040 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Daniel S. Hosken

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Matthew Weinberg

Bryn Mawr College ( email )

Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Abstract Views
1,081
rank
166,834
PlumX Metrics