Tax Collection in Developing Countries – New Evidence on Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs)

24 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2011 Last revised: 2 Sep 2013

See all articles by Christian von Haldenwang

Christian von Haldenwang

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE)

Armin von Schiller

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE); Hertie School of Governance

Maria Melody Garcia

University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: November 18, 2011

Abstract

Do semi-autonomous revenue agencies (SARAs) outperform conventional tax administrations? This paper argues that they do. Presenting the results of a panel analysis of local tax collection in Peru between 1998 and 2011, it shows that municipalities with SARAs collect more revenue than those with conventional tax administrations. In line with findings from previous research, the effect is particularly strong in the first two years of operation, but remains significantly positive in subsequent years, after a brief accommodation period. The results also indicate that SARAs generate more stable revenue, meaning that revenue volatility is less pronounced in municipalities with SARAs, which is good for budget policy and planning.

Keywords: Taxation, Semi-autonomous revenue agencies, Tax administration, Peru, Fiscal decentralization

Suggested Citation

von Haldenwang, Christian and von Schiller, Armin and Garcia, Maria Melody, Tax Collection in Developing Countries – New Evidence on Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs) (November 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961616 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961616

Christian Von Haldenwang (Contact Author)

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 6
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Armin Von Schiller

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 4
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Hertie School of Governance ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

Maria Melody Garcia

University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia 2
Rome, 00133
Italy

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