Election Inversions, Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples from Danish Elections

25 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2011

Date Written: December 14, 2011

Abstract

When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision-makers, so-called election inversions may take place, where each group have different majority outcomes. We identify two versions of such compound majority paradoxes specifically, but not exclusively, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: The 'Threshold Paradox' and the 'Federal Paradox'. The empirical relevance of the two paradoxes is illustrated with examples from three Danish elections (1971, 1990, 2011), where a majority of the voters voted for one bloc of parties but where a majority of the seats fell to another.

Keywords: social choice, voting paradoxes, electoral systems, election inversions

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Election Inversions, Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples from Danish Elections (December 14, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1972067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1972067

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Dept. of Political Science
Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5, P.O.Box 2099
Copenhagen, DK-1014
Denmark
+45 35 32 37 98 (Phone)
+45 35 32 33 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kurrild-klitgaard.net

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