The Constitutional Dilemma of European Integration

19 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2011

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.

Keywords: prisoners dilemma, constitutions, constitutional economics, public choice, European Union

JEL Classification: D70, D72, D62

Suggested Citation

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, The Constitutional Dilemma of European Integration (1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1973504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1973504

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Dept. of Political Science
Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5, P.O.Box 2099
Copenhagen, DK-1014
Denmark
+45 35 32 37 98 (Phone)
+45 35 32 33 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kurrild-klitgaard.net

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