Poison in the Wine? Tracing Gats-Minus Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements

25 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2012

See all articles by Rudolf Adlung

Rudolf Adlung

Independent

S. Miroudot

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Trade Directorate (ECH)

Date Written: January 31, 2012

Abstract

Commitments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that fall short of the same countries' obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are a relatively frequent phenomenon. However, they have gone widely unnoticed in the literature to date and drawn very little attention in relevant WTO fora either. Nevertheless, 'minus commitments' are potentially poisonous and, for various reasons, would deserve close attention. Given the broad definitional scope of the GATS, extending inter alia to commercial presence, such commitments may impinge upon the rights of third-country investors in the RTA economies. Their existence casts doubts on the legal status of the respective agreements under the GATS and can have severe implications for the trading system overall. If not complemented by comprehensive Most-favoured-Nation clauses, the RTAs concerned are disconnected from the WTO and virtually impossible to multilateralize. Based on a review of some 80,000 commitments in 66 agreements, this study seeks to develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of the frequency of 'minus commitments' and their dosage in terms of sectors, measures and modes of supply. It also discusses potential remedies from a WTO perspective.

Keywords: trade in services, GATS, regionalism

JEL Classification: F13, F15, K33, L80

Suggested Citation

Adlung, Rudolf and Miroudot, Sebastien, Poison in the Wine? Tracing Gats-Minus Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements (January 31, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2001493 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2001493

Sebastien Miroudot

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Trade Directorate (ECH) ( email )

2, rue André-Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

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