Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information

Ensaios Economicos Working Paper No. 359

Posted: 23 Mar 2000

See all articles by Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - EPGE

Flavio M. Menezes

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Akram Temimi

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

Date Written: October 1999

Abstract

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution game with n players and characterize equilibria of the subscription game involving positive contributions.

JEL Classification: D79, D89, H89

Suggested Citation

Monteiro, Paulo Klinger and Menezes, Flavio M. and Temimi, Akram, Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information (October 1999). Ensaios Economicos Working Paper No. 359, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=209371

Paulo Klinger Monteiro (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - EPGE ( email )

sala 1103
Rio de Janeiro RJ, 22250-900
Brazil
+55 21 37995838 (Phone)
+55 21 25538821 (Fax)

Flavio M. Menezes

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

Brisbane, QLD 4072
Australia

Akram Temimi

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa ( email )

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-8961 (Phone)

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