Royalties Do Petróleo E Emprego Público Nos Municípios Brasileiros (Oil Windfalls and Public Labor Market in the Brazilian Municipalities)

Posted: 21 Jul 2012

See all articles by Lauro Carnicelli

Lauro Carnicelli

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies

Fernando Postali

University of São Paulo (USP) - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 19, 2012

Abstract

A finitude dos estoques de petróleo na natureza determina a emergência de questões delicadas quanto à correta aplicação de suas rendas, visando evitar sua dissipação e a queda do bem estar da sociedade. A legislação brasileira tem se preocupado em alocar as receitas do petróleo no desenvolvimento social, mas estudos pontuais têm mostrado que as localidades beneficiadas costumam elevar os seus gastos em pessoal. Este artigo busca contribuir para o entendimento da questão, utilizando uma metodologia que permite construir um contrafactual para os municípios tratados com recursos do petróleo. O objetivo é investigar se estas transferências levam as prefeituras beneficiadas a aumentarem a contratação de funcionários públicos, em desacordo com as recomendações legais. Para isto, aplicou-se o método Duplamente Robusto a um painel de municípios observados entre 2000 e 2009. O método compõe-se de dois estágios. Primeiramente, estimaram-se as probabilidades de recepção de receitas do petróleo condicionadas a variáveis observáveis; em um segundo estágio, estimou-se um painel de efeitos fixos no conjunto de observações pertencentes a um suporte comum construído a partir dos propensity scores estimados no primeiro estágio. Os resultados mostram que as prefeituras elevam o seu quadro de funcionários diante do usufruto de rendas do petróleo, mas a despesa média com pessoal não aumenta nas cidades pertencentes ao grupo de tratamento. No Rio de Janeiro, sujeito a determinações mais específicas de seu

The finiteness of oil stocks in nature determines the emergence of critical questions about the correct application of their rents in order to prevent dissipation and society’s welfare loss. Brazilian legislation has been concerned with allocating oil revenues on social development, but case studies have shown that some benefited localities raise their spending on staff. This article aims to understand the issue, using a methodology that allows building a counterfactual for municipalities treated with oil resources. The aim is to investigate whether these transfers lead the benefited municipalities to increase the hiring of civil servants, in disagreement with the legal recommendations. For this, we applied the method Doubly Robust to a panel of municipalities observed between 2000 and 2009. The method consists of two stages. Firstly, it estimates the probability of receiving oil revenues conditioned on observable variables and, in a second stage, a fixed effect panel model was estimated with data belonging to a common support constructed from the estimated propensity scores in the first stage . The results show that local governments raise their workforce due to the enjoyment of oil revenues, but the average payroll expenditure does not increase in the treatment group. In Rio de Janeiro, subject to more specific determinations of its Court of Auditors, the effect is not significant, indicating adherence to the rules by the eligible municipalities.

Note: Downloadable document is in Portuguese.

Keywords: propensity score, Doubly Robust, oil royalties, public employment, panel

JEL Classification: J45, H77, C21

Suggested Citation

Carnicelli, Lauro and Postali, Fernando Antonio Slaibe, Royalties Do Petróleo E Emprego Público Nos Municípios Brasileiros (Oil Windfalls and Public Labor Market in the Brazilian Municipalities) (July 19, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2113475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2113475

Lauro Carnicelli (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland

Fernando Antonio Slaibe Postali

University of São Paulo (USP) - Department of Economics ( email )

Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto 908
Sao Paulo SP, 05508-900
Brazil
+55 11 30915915 (Phone)
+55 11 30915915 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
678
PlumX Metrics