Games on Networks

88 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2012

See all articles by Matthew O. Jackson

Matthew O. Jackson

Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University; Monash University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: September 2012

Abstract

We provide an overview and synthesis of the literatures analyzing games where players are connected via a network structure. We study, in particular, the impact of the structure of the network on individualsÂ’ behaviors. We focus on the game theoretic modeling, but also include some discussion of analyses of peer effects, as well as applications to diffusion, employment, crime, industrial organization, and education.

Keywords: games on networks, games with incomplete information, graphical games, network games, peer effects., social networks

JEL Classification: A14, C72, D85

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Zenou, Yves and Zenou, Yves, Games on Networks (September 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2153568

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm

Santa Fe Institute

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Yves Zenou

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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