Gender Matching and Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence

20 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Nabanita Datta Gupta

Nabanita Datta Gupta

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Anders Poulsen

University of East Anglia

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Date Written: January 2013

Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates if and how people's competitiveness depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. Participants are given information about the gender of the co‐participant they are matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co‐participant directly influences men's choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the gender information is made sufficiently salient. A higher predicted competitiveness of women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co‐participant, increases women's willingness to compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness.

JEL Classification: C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52

Suggested Citation

Datta Gupta, Nabanita and Poulsen, Anders and Villeval, Marie Claire, Gender Matching and Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence (January 2013). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 51, Issue 1, pp. 816-835, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182966 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00378.x

Nabanita Datta Gupta (Contact Author)

Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
8210 Aarhus V
Denmark
+45 87165207 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://pure.au.dk/portal/da/ndg@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Anders Poulsen

University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich NR47TJ, Norfolk
United Kingdom
+44 0 1603 591066 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/ecopeople/PoulsenA.html

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

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