Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation

45 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2013 Last revised: 8 Nov 2017

See all articles by S. McKay Price

S. McKay Price

Lehigh University - Perella Department of Finance

Jesus M. Salas

Lehigh University

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 30, 2014

Abstract

We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push for more frequent and longer conference calls in order to obtain more information with which to evaluate their investment. While independent directors push to hold conference calls, they may also prefer to have shorter conference calls to avoid potential lawsuits, proprietary costs, and/or loss of reputation that can arise from releasing too much information. Entrenched executives seek to minimize risk (such as employment and/or litigation risk) by limiting the length of conference calls or by avoiding conference calls altogether. In addition, contrary to recently proposed hypotheses, we find that executives do not receive additional compensation for bearing the risks of holding voluntary conference calls.

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, Conference calls, Governance, Compensation, Entrenchment, Institutions, REITs

JEL Classification: D80, D82, G10, G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Price, S. McKay and Salas, Jesus M. and Sirmans, C. F., Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation (January 30, 2014). Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp.181-206, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2212355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212355

S. McKay Price (Contact Author)

Lehigh University - Perella Department of Finance ( email )

621 Taylor Street
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
610-758-4787 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mckayprice.com

Jesus M. Salas

Lehigh University ( email )

Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
610-758-3238 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www3.lehigh.edu/business/faculty/salas.asp

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law ( email )

Tallahasse, FL 32306
United States
850 644-4076 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.fsu.edu/rmi

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