Physicians’ Balance Billing, Supplemental Insurance and Access to Health Care

GATE Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Working Paper No. WP 1305

19 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2013

See all articles by Izabela Jelovac

Izabela Jelovac

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

Some countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing is known for restricting access to physicians’ services while supplemental insurance against balance billing amounts is supposed to alleviate the access problem. This paper analyzes in a theoretical setting the consequences of balance billing on the fees setting and on the inequality of access among the users of physicians’ services. It also shows that supplemental insurance against the expenses associated with balance billing, rather than alleviating the access problem, increases it.

Keywords: Physicians’ fees, balance billing, supplemental insurance

JEL Classification: I13, I14, J33

Suggested Citation

Jelovac, Izabela, Physicians’ Balance Billing, Supplemental Insurance and Access to Health Care (February 1, 2013). GATE Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Working Paper No. WP 1305, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215671 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2215671

Izabela Jelovac (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

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