Local Contraction-Stability and Uniqueness

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 112

34 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2013

See all articles by Andreas Hefti

Andreas Hefti

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Zurich University of Applied Sciences

Date Written: February 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the best-response dynamics in the cases of sum-aggregative and symmetric games. If strategies are equilibrium complements, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal properties of the game. With equilibrium substitutes, local stability is stronger than uniqueness. If players adjust sequentially rather than simultaneously, this tends towards making a symmetric equilibria of symmetric games more stable. Finally, the relationship between the stability of the Nash best-response dynamics is compared to the stability of the response-dynamics induced by aggregate-taking behavior.

Keywords: contraction mapping, stability, uniqueness, aggregate-taking behavior, dominance solvability, Symmetric Games

JEL Classification: C72, D43, L13

Suggested Citation

Hefti, Andreas M., Local Contraction-Stability and Uniqueness (February 1, 2013). University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 112, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2221380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2221380

Andreas M. Hefti (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zürich
Switzerland

Zurich University of Applied Sciences ( email )

Institut fuer Angewandte Medienwissenschaft
Zur Kesselschmiede 35
Winterthur, CH 8401
Switzerland

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