Ruling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights

36 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2013

See all articles by Leonid Polishchuk

Leonid Polishchuk

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Georgiy Syunyaev

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: December 18, 2013

Abstract

We provide a theory and empirical evidence showing that the rotation of ruling elites in combination with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protection, and that such association holds for non-democratic political regimes when it is based on elites' concerns about security of their own property rights in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

Keywords: Endogenous property rights, credible commitment, "stationary bandit''

JEL Classification: K11, O17, P14

Suggested Citation

Polishchuk, Leonid and Syunyaev, Georgiy, Ruling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights (December 18, 2013). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 43/EC/2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2369317 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2369317

Leonid Polishchuk (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Georgiy Syunyaev

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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