Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

Posted: 26 Jul 2001

See all articles by Mark Armstrong

Mark Armstrong

University College London - Department of Economics

Abstract

This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient.

Suggested Citation

Armstrong, Mark, Optimal Multi-Object Auctions. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=239292

Mark Armstrong (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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