Controls and Cooperation in Interactive and Non-Interactive Settings

44 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2014 Last revised: 14 Jun 2018

See all articles by Jace Garrett

Jace Garrett

Clemson University

Jeffrey A. Livingston

Bentley University - Department of Economics

William B. Tayler

Brigham Young University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 5, 2018

Abstract

Prior research finds that controls that induce cooperation among collaborators on a project increase trust, and that this increased trust increases subsequent cooperation among collaborators. We extend this work by investigating how controls influence cooperative behavior in two settings. The first is an interactive setting where people work together and can benefit from each other’s work. The second is a non-interactive setting where people do not work together directly, but where behavior can be observed. We propose that because controls are likely to engender greater trust and reciprocity in interactive settings than in non-interactive settings, the effect of controls on future cooperative behavior will be greater for controls in interactive settings than for controls in non-interactive settings. We find that controls in both settings increase future cooperative behavior, but the effect is significantly greater in interactive settings (where reciprocity and trust are more likely to develop). Furthermore, this increased cooperation is observed in an uncontrolled task, suggesting that the control fosters trust in others, rather than trust in the control. These findings suggest that the benefits of controls are more substantial in work environments characterized by extensive teamwork and where employees benefit from each other’s work.

Keywords: trust, control system, reciprocity, Attribution Theory

JEL Classification: C91, M41, M52

Suggested Citation

Garrett, Jace and Livingston, Jeffrey A. and Tayler, William B., Controls and Cooperation in Interactive and Non-Interactive Settings (May 5, 2018). Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2482402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482402

Jace Garrett (Contact Author)

Clemson University ( email )

Clemson, SC 29631
United States

Jeffrey A. Livingston

Bentley University - Department of Economics ( email )

175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452-4705
United States
781-891-2538 (Phone)
781-891-2896 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_livingston/

William B. Tayler

Brigham Young University ( email )

Brigham Young University
519 TNRB
Provo, UT 84602
United States
(801) 422-5972 (Phone)
(801) 422-0621 (Fax)

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