The Bidder Exclusion Effect
53 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2014 Last revised: 29 Jan 2022
Date Written: September 2014
Abstract
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results to empirical work. It applies in a broad range of information settings and auction formats without requiring instruments or estimation of a complex structural model. We demonstrate the approach using US timber and used-car auction data.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Coey, Dominic and Larsen, Bradley and Sweeney, Kane, The Bidder Exclusion Effect (September 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20523, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2502685
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