Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information

21 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2015

See all articles by Jason R. Blevins

Jason R. Blevins

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Date Written: April 2015


In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous-move model, then the move-order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This article considers nonparametric identification and simulation-based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous-move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry-order effects using data from the airline industry.

JEL Classification: C57, C15, L93

Suggested Citation

Blevins, Jason R., Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information (April 2015). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 791-811, 2015, Available at SSRN: or

Jason R. Blevins (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

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