A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Analysis on How Chinese Home Appliance Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit

38 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2015 Last revised: 4 Jan 2018

Date Written: March 26, 2016

Abstract

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in the 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. The Chinese government attempted in vain to deal with this problem by legislation of related institutions and administrative control. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms were able to cope with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis here found that spot and integration are inferior to the two contract mechanisms in terms of cost and price: a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price, and maximize social welfare. Hence, through Bertrand price competition, any of two contract mechanisms is selected to dominate the supply behavior. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with a rebate on volume an against exclusive agent, and a firm who initiated this mechanism gained the largest share in the market. Estimation of a (semi) structural supply function that utilizes demand estimates showed that the price level with the dominant mechanisms is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.

Keywords: trade credit risk; distribution channel strategy; contract; convergence of mechanisms

JEL Classification: L14, L68, L81, D22, G32, O16, O17

Suggested Citation

Watanabe, Mariko, A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Analysis on How Chinese Home Appliance Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit (March 26, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2570794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2570794

Mariko Watanabe (Contact Author)

Gakushuin University ( email )

1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku
Tokyo 171-8588
Japan
+81432771914 (Phone)
432771914 (Fax)

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