The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control

23 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2001

See all articles by Damien J. Neven

Damien J. Neven

University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lars-Hendrik Röller

ESMT European School of Management and Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change

Date Written: November 2000

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies that assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, 'globalization' should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance.

Keywords: Conflict, merger control

JEL Classification: L40, O74, O78

Suggested Citation

Neven, Damien J. and Röller, Lars-Hendrik, The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control (November 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=257695

Damien J. Neven (Contact Author)

University of Geneva ( email )

Graduate Institute of International Studies
CH-1211 Geneve 4
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Lars-Hendrik Röller

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.esmt.org/eng/faculty-research/lars-hendrik-roeller/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

WZB Berlin Social Science Center - Competitiveness and Industrial Change ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
10785 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2549 1440 (Phone)
+49 30 2549 1442 (Fax)

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