Assemblies Matter: Analyzing the Choice of Form of Government in Unstable Democracies

Abstract

What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. Using a rational-choice model and focusing on a set of assumptions that fits well with unstable democracies, this paper finds that the composition of the constitutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of form of government. Who holds the majority in the constitutional assembly has a strong effect on the choice of form of government, especially when the policy conflict within the society (measured by income inequality in the model presented here) is high. This finding supports the case for a stronger focus on institutional details.

Keywords: Constitutional Choice, Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, Political Rent, Constitutional Assembly, Income Inequality, Unstable Democracies, Transition

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H11, K10