Decentralizing Education Resources: School Grants in Senegal

64 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2015

See all articles by Pedro Manuel Carneiro

Pedro Manuel Carneiro

University College London - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Oswald Koussihouèdé

Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis

Nathalie Lahire

World Bank Group

Costas Meghir

Yale University; Yale University - Cowles Foundation; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Corina Mommaerts

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Abstract

The impact of school resources on the quality of education in developing countries may depend crucially on whether resources are targeted efficiently. In this paper we use a randomized experiment to analyze the impact of a school grants program in Senegal, which decentralized a portion of the country's education budget. We find large positive effects on test scores at younger grades that persist at least two years. We show that these effects are concentrated among schools that focused funds on human resources improvements rather than school materials, suggesting that teachers and principals may be a central determinant of school quality.

Keywords: quality of education, decentralization, school resources, child development, clustered randomized control trials

JEL Classification: H52, I20, I22, I25, O15

Suggested Citation

Carneiro, Pedro Manuel and Koussihouèdé, Oswald and Lahire, Nathalie and Meghir, Costas and Mommaerts, Corina, Decentralizing Education Resources: School Grants in Senegal. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8960, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2589822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589822

Pedro Manuel Carneiro (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Oswald Koussihouèdé

Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis ( email )

Route de Ngallele
Saint-Louis
Senegal

Nathalie Lahire

World Bank Group ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Costas Meghir

Yale University ( email )

37 Hillhouse avenue
New Haven, CT CT 06511
United States
+12034323558 (Phone)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Corina Mommaerts

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics ( email )

William H. Sewell Social Science Building
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706-1393
United States

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