The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control

20 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2015

See all articles by R. Emre Aytimur

R. Emre Aytimur

University of Goettingen (Göttingen)

Aristotelis Boukouras

University of Leicester

Robert Schwager

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW); University of Magdeburg

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Date Written: April 9, 2015

Abstract

We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates’ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Keywords: elections, polarization, strategic delegation, bureaucracy, foreign influence

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Aytimur, R. Emre and Boukouras, Aristotelis and Schwager, Robert, The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control (April 9, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2592512 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592512

R. Emre Aytimur (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, 37073
Germany

Aristotelis Boukouras

University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Robert Schwager

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
00 49 621 1235160 (Phone)
00 49 621 1235215 (Fax)

University of Magdeburg

Universitätspl. 2
PSF 4120
Magdeburg, D-39106
Germany

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