Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities: Good Government or Partisan Politics?

Posted: 2 Apr 2001

See all articles by Rafael Gely

Rafael Gely

University of Missouri School of Law

Abstract

This article argues that the Supreme Court's unequal treatment of public employees in the areas of patronage and the regulation of their political activity is unwarranted. The article first analyses the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the areas of patronage and the regulation of the ability of public employees to engage in political activities. It then looks at these two areas and inquires what are the government objectives when enacting laws regulating public employees' political activities and when engaging in the practice of patronage. The article argues that in both cases, government's primary objective is to control, or manipulate the political process, by providing incentives (negative and positive) to influence the decision of public employees to be politically active. The article provides empirical support for this proposition. It concludes that the Court's approach to these two areas is misinformed, since it fails to incorporate the argument raised in the article.

Suggested Citation

Gely, Rafael, Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities: Good Government or Partisan Politics?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=264323

Rafael Gely (Contact Author)

University of Missouri School of Law ( email )

Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO MO 65211
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
2,087
PlumX Metrics