U.S. CEO Employment Agreements and Non-Competition Provisions: A Literature Survey

Executive Directors’ Remuneration in Comparative Corporate Perspective, edited by Christoph Van der Elst, Volume 11 in the European Company Law Book Series (Wolters Kluwer Publishers 2015).

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-19

30 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2015

See all articles by Randall S. Thomas

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

Norman Bishara

The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan

Date Written: August 25, 2015

Abstract

U.S. Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) remain one of the most studied groups in the law and management literature. However, the terms of the firm-CEO employment agreements are important evidence of executive’s role that often overlooked and, thus, not fully understood. This book chapter consolidates the current research on CEO employment contracts and further examines the underlying research on a specific area of these agreements, the non-compete clause. It summarizes the main findings in the existing academic literature from law, economics and finance on American CEOs’ employment contracts and non-competition agreements. We survey these different literatures to see what is known and to identify future areas for research.

This chapter has been prepared for the book, Executive Directors’ Remuneration in Comparative Corporate Perspective, edited by Christoph Van der Elst, Volume 11 in the European Company Law Book Series (Wolters Kluwer Publishers 2015).

Keywords: CEO employment agreements, contracts, non-competition provisions

JEL Classification: K

Suggested Citation

Thomas, Randall S. and Thomas, Randall S. and Bishara, Norman D, U.S. CEO Employment Agreements and Non-Competition Provisions: A Literature Survey (August 25, 2015). Executive Directors’ Remuneration in Comparative Corporate Perspective, edited by Christoph Van der Elst, Volume 11 in the European Company Law Book Series (Wolters Kluwer Publishers 2015)., Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2650707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650707

Randall S. Thomas (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

Norman D Bishara

The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-647-6823 (Phone)

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